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Abstract
This paper describes the effort to deploy a Medical Data Management service on
top of the EGEE grid infrastructure. The most widely accepted medical image stan-
dard, DICOM, was developed for fulfilling clinical practice. It is implemented in
most medical image acquisition and analysis devices. The EGEE middleware is us-
ing the SRM standard for handling grid files. Our prototype is exposing an SRM
compliant interface to the grid middleware, transforming on the fly SRM requests
into DICOM transactions. The prototype ensures user identification, strict file ac-
cess control and data protection through the use of relevant grid services. This
Medical Data Manager is easing the access to medical databases needed for many
medical data analysis applications deployed today. It offers a high level data man-
agement service, compatible with clinical practices, which encourages the migration
of medical applications towards grid infrastructures. A limited scale testbed has been
deployed as a proof of concept of this new service. The service is expected to be put
into production with the next EGEE middleware generation.
1 Medical data management in hospitals and grid
data management
The medical community is routinely using clinical images and associated medical
data for diagnosis, intervention planning and therapy follow-up. Medical imagers
are producing an increasing number of digital images for which computerized archiv-
ing, processing and analysis are needed [8, 12]. Indeed, image networks have become
a critical component of the daily clinical practice over the years. With their emer-
gence, the need for standardized medical data formats and exchange procedures
has grown [2]. For this reason, the Digital Image and COmmunication in Medicine
standard (DICOM) [6] was adopted by a large consortium of medical device ven-
dors. Picture Archiving and Communication Systems (PACS) [10], manipulating
DICOM images and often other medical data in proprietary formats, are proposed
by medical device vendors for managing clinical data. PACS are often proprietary
solutions weakly standardized. PACS may be more or less connected to the Hospi-
tal Information System (HIS), holding administrative information about patients,
and Radiological Information Systems (RIS), holding additional information for the
radiological departments. The DICOM standard, PACS, RIS and HIS have been
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developed with clinical needs in mind. They are easing the daily care of the pa-
tients and medical administrative procedures. However, their usage in other areas
is very limited. The interface with computing infrastructures for instance is almost
completely lacking. In addition, current PACS hardly address medical data man-
agement needs beyond clinical centers’ administrative boundaries, while the patient
medical folders are often wide spread over many medical sites that have been in-
volved in the patient’s healthcare. Many medical image acquisition devices are also
weakly conforming to the DICOM standard, thus hardly hiding the heterogeneity
of these systems.
In the last decades, with the growing availability of digital medical data, many
medical data processing and analysis algorithms were developed, enabling computer-
ized medical applications for the benefit of the patient and healthcare practitioners.
Although sharing the same data sources, the medical image analysis community has
different requirements for medical system than the healthcare community. Many
algorithms are developed for processing and producing image files. A common pro-
cedure for accessing all medical data sources is needed.
Given the enormous amount of medical data produced inside hospitals and the
cost of medical data computing (especially image analysis algorithms), grid proved
to be very useful infrastructures for a large variety of medical applications [11].
Grids are providing computing resources and workload systems that ease applica-
tion code deployment and usage. Moreover, grids are providing distributed data
management services that are well suited for handling medical data geographically
spread throughout various medical centers [5, 7, 4, 9, 3]. However, existing grid
middlewares are often only dealing with data files and do not provide higher level
services for manipulating medical data. Medical data often have to be manually
transferred and transformed from hospital sources to grid storage before being pro-
cessed and analyzed. Such manual interventions are tedious and often limit system-
atic use of grid infrastructures. In some cases, they may even prevent the use of
grids, e.g. when the amount of data to transfer is too large. As a consequence, the
first key to the success of the systematic deployment of medical image processing
algorithms is to provide a data manager that:
• Provides access to medical data sources for computing without interfering
with the clinical practice.
• Ensures transparency so that accessing medical data does not require any
specific user intervention.
• Ensures a high data protection level to respect patients privacy.
The Medical Data Manager (MDM) service described in this paper was designed
to fulfill these constraints. It was developed with the support of the EGEE1 Euro-
pean IST project. The remaining of this paper describes the technical requirements
to be addressed for such a service and details the service design.
2 Clinical usage of medical data
The DICOM standard introduced earlier encompasses, among other things, an im-
age format and an image communication protocol. A DICOM image usually con-
tains one slice (a 2D image) acquired using any medical imaging modality (MRI,
CT-scan, PET, SPECT, ultrasound, X-ray... [1]). A DICOM image may contain a
multi-slice data set but this is rarely encountered. A DICOM image contains both
the image data itself and a set of additional information (or metadata) related to
1Enabling Grids for E-sciencE, http://www.eu-egee.org
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the image, the patient, the acquisition parameters and the radiology department.
DICOM metadata are stored in fields. Each field is identified by a unique tag de-
fined in the DICOM standard. A given field may be present or absent depending
on the imager that produced the image. The standard is open and image device
manufacturers tend to use their own fields for various information. A couple of fields
(such as image size) are mandatory but experience proved that surprises should be
expected when analyzing a DICOM image. The image itself is usually stored as raw
data. Most imaging devices produce one intensity value per image pixel, coded in
a 12 bit format. Other format may be encountered such as 16 bit data or lossless
JPEG.
2.1 DICOM protocol, storage, and security
Most (reasonably modern) medical image acquisition device are DICOM clients.
DICOM servers are computers with on-disk and/or tape back-ends able to store
and retrieve DICOM images. The DICOM protocol defines the communication
protocol between DICOM servers and clients.
There is no standardization on DICOM storage. DICOM servers are implement-
ing their own policy of data storage. One should not see DICOM data sets as a set
of files. As stated above, a single DICOM image usually contains only one image
slice. In practice, during a medical examination (a DICOM study), a radiologist
acquires several 2D and 3D images, representing up to hundreds to thousands of
slices. A study is divided in one or several series and each serie is composed by a
set of slices (that can be stacked to assemble a a volume when they belong to the
same 3D image). Note that there is often no notion of 3D image encoded in the
DICOM format: a serie may contain a set of slices composing several 3D images.
The way a DICOM server stores these data sets on disk is irrelevant just like the
way a database stores its table is usually not known from the users: the medical
user is never exposed to the DICOM storage and does not need to know if different
files are used for each DICOM slice, serie, study, etc. Metadata are included in
DICOM image headers, making them difficult to manipulate. A DICOM server will
often extract these metadata and store them in a database to ease data search.
The DICOM security model is rather weak. DICOM files are unencrypted and
transported unencrypted. Files contain patient data. The DICOM server security
model is based on a per-application basis: all users having access to some DICOM
client application can access to the information that the server returns to this specific
application. DICOM servers are using random file names without any connection to
the patient information and a proprietary data storage policy. To cope with these
data protection limitations, security is often implemented in hospitals by isolating
the images network from the outside world.
2.2 Access to medical images
Each image acquisition device is a potential DICOM compliant medical image
source. In a radiological department, one or several DICOM servers can be set
up to centralize data acquired on this site. Medical data are naturally distributed
over the different acquisition sites.
In clinical practice, physicians do not access directly to image files. They iden-
tify data by associated metadata such as patient name, acquisition date, radiologist
name, etc. The data are transferred mainly for visualization purposes. The physi-
cian quickly scans the slices stack in the DICOM study and focuses on the slices he
or she is interested in.
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3 Medical image analysis
In the medical image analysis community, the needs are quite different. One often
needs to identify images through metadata too, although the search are not neces-
sarily for nominative data but often related to the acquisition type or body region.
3D images are exported to disk files for post-processing and ease of use. Various
3D medical image format may be used to stack different DICOM slices into a single
image volume (the most common being the analyze file format).
3.1 Enforcing medical data and security
All medical data should be considered as sensitive to preserve patient privacy. Nom-
inative medical data are of course the most critical data and therefore, no binding
between nominative data and images should be possible for non accredited users.
In clinical practice, this result is often obtained by isolation of the image network.
Only physicians participating to one patient healthcare should have access to the
data of this patient.
On a grid, the distribution of data make security problem very sensitive. To
ensure patient privacy, the header of all DICOM images sent by a DICOM server
should be wiped out, at least partially, to ensure anonymity. All images that are
stored out of the source center should be encrypted to ensure that non accredited
users cannot read the image content.
4 Medical Data Management Service
4.1 EGEE grid middleware
The EGEE project is currently deploying the LCG2 middleware2 on its production
infrastructure. LCG2 is based on GLOBUS2, Condor, and the other services devel-
oped in the European DataGrid project3. A new generation middleware, gLite4, is
under testing and should be deployed at Spring 2006. Our Medical Data Manager
service (MDM) is based on gLite.
The gLite middleware provides workload management services for submitting
computing tasks to the grid infrastructure and data management services for man-
aging distributed files. The data management is based on a set of Storage Elements
which are storage resources distributed in the various sites participating in the in-
frastructure (currently, more than 180 sites distributed all over Europe and beyond).
All storage elements expose a same interface for interacting with the other middle-
ware services: the Storage Resource Manager interface (SRM) that is standardized
in the context of the Global Grid Forum5. The SRM is handling local data at a file
level. It offers an interface to create, fetch, pin, or destroy files among other things.
It does not implement data transfer by itself. Additional services such as GridFTP
or gLiteIO are coexisting on storage elements to provide transfer capabilities.
In addition to storage resources, the gLite data management system includes a
File Catalog (Fireman) offering a unique entry point for files distributed on all grid
storage elements. Each file is uniquely identified through a Global Unique IDentifier
(GUID). The file catalog contains tables associating each GUID to file location. For
efficiency and fault tolerance reasons, files may be replicated on different sites. Thus,
each GUID may be associated to several locations. To ease the manipulation by
2LCG2: Large hadron collider Computing Grid middleware, http://lcg-web.cern.ch
3European DataGrid project, http://www.edg.org
4gLite middleware, http://www.glite.org
5Global Grid Forum, http://www.ggf.org
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Figure 1: Overview of the medical data manager
users, human readable Logical File Names (LFN) can be associated to each file
(each GUID).
4.2 Medical Data Management service design
The Medical Data Management service architecture is diagrammed in figure 1. On
the left, is represented a clinical site: various imagers in an hospital are pushing
the images produced on a DICOM server. Inside the hospital, clinicians can access
the DICOM server content through DICOM clients. In the center of figure 1, the
MDM internal logic is represented. On the right side, the grid services interfacing
with the MDM are shown.
All middleware services requiring access to data storage do so through SRM
requests sent to storage elements. To remain compatible with the rest of the grid
infrastructure, our MDM service is based on a SRM-DICOM interface software. The
SRM-DICOM core is receiving SRM requests and transforms them into DICOM
transactions addressed to the medical servers. Thus, medical data servers can be
shared between clinicians (using the classical DICOM interface inside hospitals) and
image analysis scientists (using the SRM-DICOM interface to access the same data
bases) without interfering with the clinical practice. An internal scratch space is
used to transform DICOM data into files that are accessible through data transfer
services (GridFTP or gLiteIO).
A metadata manager is also used to extract DICOM headers information and
ease data search. The AMGA6 service [13] is used for ensuring secured storage of
these very sensitive data. The AMGA server holds a relation between each DICOM
slice and the image metadata.
This specialized SRM is not providing a classical Read/Write interface to a
storage element. A classical R/W storage element can symmetrically receive grid
files to be stored or deliver archived files to the grid on request. In the MDM, The
SRM interface only accepts registration request coming internally from the hospital.
To avoid interfering with the clinical data, external grid files are not permitted to
6ARDA metadata catalog project, http://project-arda-dev.web.cern.ch/
project-arda-dev/metadata/
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Figure 2: Triggered action at image creation
be registered on the MDM storage space: only get requests are authorized from
the grid side. If classical grid storage is desired (with write capability), a classical
secondary SRM can be installed on the same host.
For data encryption needs, a secured encryption key catalog is also used. It is
named hydra catalog as it uses a split key storage strategy to improve security and
fault tolerance [15, 14].
An Abstraction layer, currently being prototyped and tested, is also depicted on
the diagram. Its role is to offer a higher level abstraction for accessing 3D images
by associating all DICOM slices corresponding to a single volume. Indeed, most
medical image processing applications are not manipulating 2D images indepen-
dently but rather consider complete volumes. The abstraction layer is associating a
single GUID to each volume. On a request for the volume associated to this GUID,
all corresponding slices are transferred from the DICOM server and assembled in a
single volume in scratch space.
4.3 Internal service interaction patterns
To fulfill its role, the MDM service needs to be notified when files are produced
by the imagers and stored into the DICOM server. This notification triggers a file
registration procedure that is depicted in figure 2. The DICOM data triggering the
operation is first stored into the hospital DICOM server as usual. The DICOM
header is then analyzed to extract image identifying information. This DICOM
ID is used to build a Storage URL (SURL) as used by the grid File Catalog to
locate files. The SURL is registered into the File Catalog and a GUID associated
to this data on the grid side. The other metadata extracted from the DICOM
header are stored into the AMGA metadata server. Finally, encryption keys that
are associated to the file and that will be used for data retrieval are stored into the
hydra distributed database.
Once DICOM data sets have been registered into the MDM, the server is able to
deliver requested data to the grid as depicted in figure 3. A client library is used for
this purpose. To cover all application use cases, the MDM client library provides
APIs for requesting files based on their grid identifier (GUID) or the metadata
attached to the file. In case of request on the metadata, a database query is first
made to the AMGA server and the list of GUIDs of images matching the query are
returned. The SRM-DICOM server can then deliver images requested through their
GUID. SRM get requests are translated into DICOM get queries. Data extracted
from the DICOM server are first written to an internal scratch space. Their format is
transformed into a simple 3D image file format (a human readable header including
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Figure 3: Accessing DICOM images
image size and encoding, followed by the raw image data). In this transformation,
the DICOM header, containing patient identifying operations, are lost to preserve
anonymity. The files are also encrypted before being sent out to ensure that no
sensitive information is never transfered nor stored on the grid in a readable format.
Files are then transferred through the gLiteIO service and returned to the client in
an encrypted form. The file is only decrypted in memory of the client host, given
that the client is authorized to access the file encryption keys.
4.4 MDM client
On the client side, three levels of interfaces are available to access and manipulate
the data hold by the MDM. The MDM is seen from the middleware as any storage
resource exposing a standard SRM interface, the standard data management client
interface can be used to access images provided that their GUID is known. The
files retrieved using this standard interface are encrypted. The second interface is
an extra middleware layer which encompasses access to the encryption key and the
SRM. Thus images can be fetched and decrypted locally. The third and last level of
interface is the fully MDM aware client library represented in figure 3. It provides
access to encrypted files and in-memory decryption of the data on the application
side, plus access to the metadata through the AMGA client interface.
5 Discussion
5.1 Data security
The security model of the MDM relies on several services: (i) file access control,
(ii) files anonymization, (iii) files encryption, and (iv) secured access to metadata.
The user is coherently identified through a single X509 certificate and all services
involved in security are using the same identification procedure. The file access
control is enforced by the gLiteIO service which accepts Access Control Lists (ACLs)
for fine grained access control. The hydra key store and the AMGA metadata
services also accept ACLs. To read an image content, a user needs to be authorized
both to access the file and to the encryption key. The access rights to the sensitive
metadata associated to the files are administrated independently. Thus, it is possible
to grant access to an encrypted file only (e.g. for replicating a file without accessing
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to the content), to the file content (e.g. for processing the data without revealing
the patient identity), or to the full file metadata (e.g. for medical usage).
Through ACLs, it is possible to implement complex use cases, granting access
rights (for listing, reading, or writing) to patients, physicians, healthcare practi-
tioners, or researchers needing to process medical data, independently from each
other.
5.2 Medical metadata schema
A minimal metadata schema is defined in the MDM service for all images stored. It
provides basic information on the patient owning the image, the image properties,
acquisition parameters, etc. There are two main indexes used: a patient ID, for all
nominative information associated to patients and the image GUID for all informa-
tion associated to images. The patient ID is a unique but irreversible field (such as
a MD5 sum on the patient field name). Four main relational tables are used:
• The Patient table, indexed on the patient ID, contains the most sensitive
identifying data (patient name, sex, date of birth, etc).
• The Image table, indexed on the image GUID, contains technical information
about the image (size, encoding, etc). It establishes a relation with the patient
ID.
• The Medical table, indexed on the image GUID, contains additional informa-
tion on the acquisition (image modality, acquisition place and date, radiolo-
gists, etc).
• The DICOM table, indexed on the image GUID, contains the image DICOM
identifiers used for querying the DICOM server.
To remain extensible, an additional Protocol table associates image GUIDs with
medical protocol name. Through AMGA, the user can create as many medical pro-
tocols as needed, containing specific information related to some particular acqui-
sition (e.g. a temporal protocol for cardiac acquisitions, etc). AMGA also enables
per table access right control, allowing restricting access to the most sensitive data
(e.g. the Patient table) to the minimum number of users.
6 Testbed
The Medical Data Manager has been deployed on several sites for testing pur-
poses. Three sites are actually holding data in three DICOM servers installed at
I3S (Sophia Antipolis, France), LAL (Orsay, France) and CREATIS (Lyon, France).
In addition to the DICOM servers, these sites have installed the core MDM ser-
vices: a SRM-DICOM server and associated database back-end, a gLiteIO service,
a GridFTP service, and all dependencies in the gLite middleware. Client have been
deployed on all these three sites.
To complete the installation, an AMGA catalog has also been set up in CREATIS
(Lyon) for holding all sites’ metadata, and an hydra key store is deployed at CERN
(Geneva, Switzerland) for keeping file encryption keys.
Given the number of services involved, the installation and configuration pro-
cedure is currently complex. It is being worked out to ease the testbed extension.
The MDM service should be deployed in hospitals where little support is provided
for the informatics infrastructure.
The testbed deployed has been used to demonstrate the viability of the service
by registering and retrieving DICOM files across sites. For testing purposes, DI-
COM data registrations are triggered by hand. Registered files could be retrieved
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and used from EGEE grid nodes transparently, using the standard EGEE data man-
agement interface. The next important milestone will be to experiment the system
in connection with hospitals by registering real clinical data freshly acquired and
registered on the fly from the hospital imagers. This step involves entering a more
complex clinical protocol with strong guarantee on the data privacy protection. The
security cannot be neglected at any level at this point.
7 Conclusion and future work
The Medical Data Manager service presented in this paper is an important milestone
for enabling medical image processing applications on a grid infrastructure. Its main
strength are:
• To access medical databases without interfering with clinical practice. Data
are kept on clinical sites and transparently transferred to the grid only when
needed.
• To expose standard interfaces to other grid services. The MDM is fully inte-
grated in the gLite middleware.
• To ensure a high level of security to preserve patients privacy.
The MDM prototype was successfully deployed and tested in a controlled com-
puting environment. The next step will see interfacing to medical imagers inside
hospitals. It will require to simplify the installation and configuration procedures
as most as possible.
The core MDM development is not finished yet and additional functionalities
will be included to enrich the service. In particular, the abstraction layer depicted in
figure 1 will soon be available. Applications will then be able to retrieve 3D volume
files rather than single slices. In addition, metadata are expected to be distributed
in the different clinical sites where data are acquired rather than being centralized
as it is the case in our testbed. This configuration will be more acceptable to the
clinical world to keep control on the hospital data. It will require deploying several
AMGA servers on different sites and exposing a centralized query service able to
retrieve data from these different servers.
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